SVELTE Real-time intrusion detection in the Internet of Things

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Introduction

- Millions of smart objects
- ► 6LoWPAN (IPv6)
- Connected directly to Internet
- High Risk
- Attacker Can Access
- Intrusion Detection System is required
- IDS analyse network to detect error

Motivation

- There are two types of existing IDS
- Signature based detections

Match network behavior on basis of Signature of attacks Cannot deal with new attacks High Cost

Anomaly based detections

determine the normal network behavior use ordinary behavior as baseline High Computation Time

SVELTE

- A lightweight and effective IDS
- ► First IDS designed specially for IOT
- Have a integrated firewall



Components

► 6LoWPAN Mapper

Get the information about network construct it using RPL (IPv6 routing Protocol)

Intrusion detection in SVELTE

Detect disturbance by analysing the mapped data

Distributed mini-firewall

Filter traffic (unwanted)

RPL Protocol

- Each node has ID
- Rank increases (from root to node)
- Uses RPL DODAG (Direction oriented Directed Acyclic Graph)
 Support two modes 1. Uni-directional 2. Bi-Directional
- Every node has capability to find direct of flow



Intrusion detection

- Network graph inconsistency detection
 Attacker can create inequality in network
 Send wrong information by node
 It checks the node IDs rank assigned by 6mapper component
 If node IDs and ranks are not according assigned values, alarm is raised
 - Checking node availability
 Check if all nodes working properly or not
 Keeps log of each node create a whitelist of nodes
 Compare white list with total nodes

Intrusion detection

- Routing graph validity
 - Attacker can change the flow of network
 - It check routing of graph
 - Detect sinkhole attacks by analysing network tropology
 - Rank decreases from child to root
- End-to-end packet loss adaptation
 It alternate path if packet is not received by destination

Mini-firewall

- Intrusion detection protects network internally
- Mini-Firewall protect network from global attackers
- Attacking is very easy for hosts out of network
- It filters the external nodes
- By comparing threshold value of local host with external host

Evaluation

Experiment setup

Test on Cooja (network simulator) with Linux

- SVELTE detection and true positive rate
 Evaluate the number of defective nodes
- Energy overhead
 Measured SVELT's power consumption
- Memory consumption
 - Showed the RAM requirements

SVELTE detection and true positive rate Sinkhole Attacks



Selective Forwarding Attack



Energy overhead



(a) Energy usage for the entire network (with *duty cycling*) in 30 minutes.

Memory Consumption

Table 3

Out of total 48k of ROM size in a constrained device (Tmoke sky), SVELTE requires 1.76k. However, in the 6BR (typically a PC) the size grows when the number of nodes increases.

Configuration	Total ROM (byte)	Overhead (byte)
6Mapper client Firewall client	44,264 43,556	1414 0246
Packet loss improvement	43,264	0122
6Mapper server (1 node, 1 neighbor)	46,798	3580
6Mapper server (8 node, 1 neighbor)	46,798	3846
6Mapper server (16 nodes, 1 neighbor)	46,800	4152
6Mapper server (16 nodes, 8 neighbors)	46,924	4724

Table 4

Additional RAM usage by SVELTE for handling a single event inside a constrained node.

Event	RAM (byte)
6Mapper response handling	162
Firewall handling	24
Packet lost correction	188

Extensions

- Easily extendable
- Can do wormhole detection
- Pinpoint the filter node

Improves accuracy to detect selective forward attacks

Conclusion

- ► 6LoWPAN network main part of IOT
- Security of 6LoWPAN network very important
- ▶ SVELTE , First IDS for IOT
- Working with selective forwarding attacks , altered information and sinkhole
- Extendable